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Summary 
Settlement between individuals on relationship breakdown has received increasing 
attention in recent years with the promotion of autonomy and private ordering 
underlining this trend. In exploring this development, this article will suggest that the 
conception of justice on family separation varies depending on the nature of the 
dispute and the route to settlement. A paradigm of justice can be identified with three 
conceptual spaces starting to emerge: official, operative and outsider justice. Drawing 
on this framework, this article will argue that most individuals’ experience of family 
disputes is via outsider justice – where family law and legal rules may have little 
impact on the outcome of disputes and family law may become a simplified version 
of its former self. This article will draw on the author’s various empirical studies to 
examine how specific discourse on private ordering and settlement shapes this justice 
paradigm in family finances.  
  
Introduction 
Settlement between individuals on relationship breakdown has acquired the status of a 
new practice norm in family justice. This in itself is uncontroversial. Recent policy,3 
consultation and review documents,4 as well as academic commentary5 highlight the 
government’s emphasis on collaboration between the parties. This can be observed 
																																																								
1 C Smart, The Ties That Bind (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984). 
2 University of Bristol Law School. I am grateful to Professor Judith Masson, Joanna 
Miles and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts; the 
views expressed remain solely my own. 
3 For example, Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings (MIAMs) are now 
compulsory for all couples that would like to make a court application to determine a 
private family law dispute unless an exemption applies. See Children and Families 
Act 2014, s 10. 
4 See Ministry of Justice, Transforming our justice system: summary of reforms and 
consultation, Cm 9321 (2016) para 1.5; Department for Work and Pensions, 
Supporting Separated Families: Securing Children’s Futures, Cm 8399 (2012). 
Furthermore, it was suggested in the Final Report of the Family Justice Review (MoJ, 
2011) that: ‘Mediation and similar support should be used as far as possible to support 
individuals themselves to reach agreements about arrangements, rather than having 
arrangement imposed by the courts.’ (Annex A).  
5 S McKay, ‘Child Support, child contact and social class’ in J Wallbank and J 
Herring (eds), Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law (Routledge, 2014); J Eekelaar 
and M Maclean, Family Justice: The Work of Family Judges in Uncertain Times 
(Hart, 2013) and A Diduck, ‘Autonomy and family justice’ [2016] CFLQ 133. 
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most readily in relation to child arrangements6 but can also be observed in the family 
finance7 and child support8 contexts. This development is particularly significant now 
that legal aid has been removed from the vast majority of private family law cases and 
the prioritisation of private ordering of family disputes in an era of austerity.9 
Research has also emphasised how settlement is at the heart of outcome and solution-
seeking processes and strategies for professionals within the family justice system.10 
 
The word ‘settlement’ is loaded with connotations of agreement, conformity and 
harmony between the parties as regards both process and outcome. However, 
empirical research on settlement in financial remedy cases has concluded that 
divorcing couples conclude their affairs for a variety of reasons, not all positive, either 
in terms of process or outcome.11 Furthermore, there has been much written about the 
potential difficulties with settlement outcomes, particularly from a gender 
perspective12 and for the most vulnerable in society,13 – to what extent does 
settlement provide a ‘just’ outcome as opposed to being ‘just about settlement’?14 
 
With settlement, private ordering, autonomy and vulnerability occupying much 
academic literature on family justice, one area that remains under explored is the 
potential relationship between the route used by parties to achieve settlement of their 
																																																								
6 Ministry of Justice and Department for Education, The Government Response to the 
Family Justice Review: A system with children and families at its heart, Cm 8273 
(2012), at para 65. 
7 Ministry of Justice Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales, 
Cm 7967, (2010), at para 4.157. 
8 See Ministerial Foreword in Department for Work and Pensions, Government 
response to the Consultation: Supporting separated families; securing children’s 
futures, Cm 8742 (2013), at p 5. 
9 Ministry of Justice, Reform of legal aid in England and Wales: The Government 
response, Cm 8072 (2011), see Ministerial Foreword at p 3-4 and p 8 at para 10. 
10 For research on the various professions’ approaches to settlement within family 
justice see for example, G Davis, S Cretney and J Collins, Simple Quarrels: 
Negotiating Money and Property Disputes on Divorce (Oxford University Press, 
1994); E Hitchings, J Miles and H Woodward, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: 
Understanding financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 2013); M Maclean 
and J Eekelaar, Family Law Advocacy: How Barristers Help the Victims of Family 
Failure (Hart, 2009); A Barlow, R Hunter, J Smithson and J Ewing, Mapping Paths 
to Family Justice: Resolving Family Disputes in Neoliberal Times (Palgrave, 2017). 
11 For example, see E Hitchings et al, ibid. 
12 See A Barlow et al, Mapping Paths to Family Justice: Resolving Family Disputes 
in Neoliberal Times (Palgrave, 2017), ch 6 and T Wilkinson-Ryan and D Small, 
‘Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioural Economics of Divorce Bargaining’ 
(2008) 26 Law and Inequality 109. 
13 See J Wallbank, ‘Universal norms, individualization and the need for recognition: 
the failure(s) of the self-managed post-separation family’ and A Diduck, ‘Autonomy 
and vulnerability in family law: the missing link’ both in J Wallbank and J Herring 
(eds), Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law (Routledge, 2014). 
14  H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 117.  
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family dispute and the role of law and justice:15 is settlement regulated by the law and 
formalised by the court differently shaped and conceived from settlement informally 
delivered by the parties? The discussion in this article is prompted by this focus on 
settlement across the private family justice system. Most private family law decision-
making is now undertaken outside of the official court system. As is well known, 
approximately 90% of separated parents make post-separation contact arrangements 
for their child(ren) without recourse to the courts.16 Likewise, there is a research black 
hole concerning the two-thirds of couples who divorce but who do not obtain a 
financial order on divorce.17 We have little understanding of this unknown cohort and 
their experiences of this ‘delegalised’ space:18 are they agreeing or just ignoring 
financial and/or children issues? What are they settling for and how are they 
achieving settlement?  
 
In the wake of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO), there has been increasing interest in the potential diminution of family 
justice. Eekelaar has suggested that while it may be ‘too melodramatic to announce 
the death of family justice … there is evidence that at least some policy-makers have 
a diminished concept of what constitutes justice in this regard.’19 It will be suggested 
that exploring family justice by reference to the routes to settlement will enable an 
examination of the role of law and legal norms within these new justice spaces. This 
approach is particularly important given the focus and weight placed on achieving 
settlement within current policy discourse. While other conceptions of justice such as 
participatory or formally imposed justice,20 procedural or substantive justice,21 and 
																																																								
15 See A Barlow et al, Mapping Paths to Family Justice: Resolving Family Disputes 
in Neoliberal Times (Palgrave, 2017) for an exploration of three paths to family 
dispute resolution: mediation, solicitor negotiation and collaborative law. 
16 A Blackwell and F Dawe, Non-Resident Parental Contact (ONS, 2003) and D 
Lader, Omnibus Survey Report No.38. Non-resident parental contact, 2007-2008. A 
report on the research using the National Statistics Omnibus Survey produced on 
behalf of the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Children, Schools and 
Families (ONS, 2008). 
17 Family Court statistics quarterly. Family court tables: January to March 2017 
(MoJ, 2017) Table 11, which charts the decline in proportion of divorce cases started 
with financial remedy orders from 41% in 2003 to 32.4% in 2014. 
18 This new term has been used recently by L Smith, ‘Chasing Shadows: online 
information and advice on family law disputes’, paper presented at Leverhulme 
International Network Conference on New Families; New Governance, London: 
University of Notre Dame London Campus, September 2014. Available at: 
http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/collegeofsocialsciencesand
internationalstudies/law/familyregulationandsociety/Speakers_Briefing_papers_all_se
ssions.pdf. See also A Diduck, ‘Autonomy and family justice’ [2016] CFLQ 133 at p 
136. 
19 J Eekelaar, ‘Not of the Highest Importance’: Family justice under threat’ (2011) 
33(4) JSWFL 311, at p 311. 
20 L Parkinson, ‘The place of mediation in the family justice system’ [2013] CFLQ 
200, at p 212. 
21 See discussion in H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press, 
2008), pp 10-16. 
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outcome- or behaviour-focused approaches22 all have their place within the current 
debate, family law’s promotion of settlement, autonomy and private ordering requires 
that we examine family justice differently: through a settlement-oriented lens. 
 
The title of this article is adapted from Carol Smart’s book. In it, she examines the 
way in which private law ‘sustains and perpetuates women’s economic dependence 
within marriage and the family’ by creating marriage as a legal status.23 In drawing 
attention to the way in which law indirectly legitimises the ‘preconditions which 
create an unequal power structure’ of men over women in the familial household, the 
important element of Smart’s argument is the appearance of neutrality which the law 
conveys. It is this appearance of neutrality – highlighted through the use of terms such 
as fairness, equality, settlement and autonomy – which make women particularly 
vulnerable during financial settlement negotiations.24 While the financial implications 
of autonomy and settlement for women on divorce have been explored elsewhere,25 
this article will examine how the legal status of marriage (the ties that bind) can create 
entitlement and responsibility, but that the new norms of settlement, autonomy and 
private ordering potentially limit those legal consequences. Alison Diduck has 
explored the de-legalisation of family disputes in relation to the boundary between 
public and private concern by suggesting that the ‘virtual de-legalisation of family 
disputes … is pursued on an ad hoc basis by almost all participants in the system, and 
is supported by the ideology of autonomy’.26 This article takes the analysis one stage 
further by focusing on how law is being used within each justice space and how, for 
example, law and legal norms may not bind the parties upon divorce and separation in 
the new post-LASPO era if parties choose a particular settlement route.  
 
Rather than propose one all-encompassing conception of justice seen in cases of 
private settlement, the argument put forward here draws on empirical research to 
suggest that the conception of justice varies depending on the route to settlement. 
Three conceptions of justice can be identified which correspond with the settlement 
routes taken by individuals facing a family dispute: official, operative and outsider 
justice. In resolving their dispute, parties may operate within one or more of the 
justice spaces en route to achieving resolution of the dispute. Within these justice 
spaces it will be argued that the role of the law that creates legal entitlements is being 
increasingly downplayed, and correspondingly that the law within settlement 
diminishes accordingly. This raises important questions for the majority of the 
divorcing population who are ‘outside’ the formal justice system with respect to any 																																																								
22 See J Eekelaar and M Maclean, Family Justice: The Work of Family Judges in 
Uncertain Times (Hart, 2013), p 8. 
23 C Smart, The Ties That Bind (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p xi. 
24 See for example, A Diduck, ‘Autonomy and vulnerability in family law: the 
missing link’ in J Wallbank and J Herring (eds), Vulnerabilities, Care and Family 
Law (Routledge, 2014) and A Diduck, ‘What is Family Law For?’ (2011) 64 Current 
Legal Problems 287. 
25 See for example, H Fisher and H Low, ‘Who Wins, Who Loses and Who Recovers 
from Divorce?’ and D Price, ‘Pension Accumulation and Gendered Household 
Structures: What are the Implications of Changes in Family Formation for Future 
Financial Inequality?’, both in J Miles and R Probert (eds), Sharing Lives, Dividing 
Assets: An Inter-Disciplinary Study (Hart, 2009). 
26 A Diduck, ‘Autonomy and family justice’ [2016] CFLQ 133, p 136. 
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property or financial settlement. Individuals without legal support or judicial 
oversight are negotiating the terms of their own divorce without the formal legal 
framework to uphold rights and responsibilities becoming engaged. A key 
consequence of marriage is therefore at risk of being downplayed, missed or even 
ignored.  
 
The three conceptions of family justice 
 
The following discussion is concerned with examining three different conceptions of 
justice. This will be achieved by drawing on evidence from various empirical studies 
to demonstrate how specific discourse on private ordering and settlement shapes this 
new justice paradigm. I will examine the role of law and procedure within each justice 
space (the type of justice being produced); the place of the dispute (where justice 
occurs, the most obvious example being the court); the method(s) used to resolve the 
dispute (what process is used to achieve justice, for example adjudication) and the 
relevant participants involved in the dispute (those who are receiving and providing 
justice). Drawing on this conceptual framework, I will suggest that as the settlement 
route moves further away from the official justice space, the role of the law is being 
increasingly downplayed and that this could leave many families vulnerable as a 
consequence. This is particularly apparent in relation to the potential simplification of 
legal rights and responsibilities when dividing assets or agreeing arrangements for 
children. While justice provided and received by the parties themselves may not 
necessarily mean injustice, the increasing absence of legal advice in the ordinary case 
reflects a concern suggested by Eekelaar and Maclean: 
 
‘Although most issues are disposed of elsewhere in the family justice system, 
the judiciary remains at its core. This is because, quite simply, the purpose of a 
justice system is ultimately to safeguard people’s legal rights … But it is one 
thing to take a responsible decision to compromise or abandon your legal rights; 
it is another thing to yield without any knowledge of what your rights are, or if 
you know them, to yield under undue pressure, or because you lack the means 
to protect them. The justice system is there to try to prevent those things 
happening. And a justice system is anchored in the judiciary.’ 27 
 
At the heart of this quote is the centrality of the judiciary and formal justice in family 
justice. This formal approach to justice is therefore where I begin to outline my three 
conceptions of family justice and to argue that the role of the law lessens as settlement 
moves away from that system anchor. 
 
Official justice  
Official justice occurs inside and outside of the formal justice setting of the 
courtroom. As Eekelaar and Maclean’s quote emphasises, judicial determination of an 
issue is typically associated with formal justice. While the formal court environment 
is an essential component of official justice, this conception encompasses a broader 
range of settings. Instead, the development of a settlement-oriented analysis enables 
justice to be considered through the route to settlement. Using this analytical 
approach, official justice can therefore also take place beyond the court. Outcomes are 																																																								
27 J Eekelaar and M Maclean, Family Justice: The Work of Family Judges in 
Uncertain Times (Hart, 2013), p 8-9. 
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not only delivered through the traditional methods of adjudication and pre-hearing 
settlement formalised in a consent order, but also through the state–endorsed 
administrative mechanisms by which child support is calculated and collected; 
through the settlement routes of arbitration and collaborative law; via the potentially 
binding nature of pre-nuptial agreements which take place outside of the court but 
negotiated through solicitors; and through consent orders which are negotiated outside 
of the court setting but which must be sent to court for approval. The key association 
between these routes to official justice is the prescribed nature of that settlement path 
with predetermined and defined legal principles and/or formula used to assist or 
determine the outcome in a given case. In the case of collaborative law, for example, 
the path to any potential settlement is laid down in a formal collaborative agreement 
between the parties with legal principles assisting in the generation of an agreement. 
The legal principles themselves may be statutory or judicial, discretionary or even 
rule-based, but the key issue is that those who are making use of, interpreting and/or 
applying these rules (the participants) are doing so within prescribed and recognised 
boundaries. While in many instances, the ‘outcome’ in official justice will be legally 
binding (formal adjudication and consent orders), this does not necessarily have to be 
the case. For example, in the case of pre-nuptial agreements, an outcome-focused as 
opposed to settlement-focused analysis would suggest that pre-nuptial agreements do 
not fall within an official justice conception. Not only is the agreement inchoate until 
the parties’ divorce but the agreement is deliberately intended to provide for a 
different result to that provided through a formal judicial determination. However, by 
using a settlement lens for the analysis, the use of solicitor negotiation to reach a 
potentially binding agreement means that predetermined and defined legal principles 
(for example, judicial guidance in Radmacher v Granatino28) will assist in the 
determination of an outcome that should be upheld by a court in the event of the 
couple divorcing.29 What places this within the margins of official justice is the fact 
that a couple have negotiated their agreement using solicitors and relying on legal 
advice, in a prescribed and formal manner. This results in an agreement that will bind 
a future court unless it would be unfair to the parties to do so. The issue for solicitors 
is ensuring that any agreement is recognised and to ensure that it has determinative 
weight. Formality and independent legal advice are currently the best means of 
achieving this. As one solicitor interviewee suggested in the pre-nuptial agreement 
research study:30 
 
You can’t avoid but advising them on the situation that if they did divorce and if 
you didn’t have a premarital agreement, what the possible results would be. If 
they did have a premarital agreement and one sought to go beyond it and argue 
against its validity, what factors would we look at and what would that result in. 																																																								
28 [2010] UKSC 42. 
29 Ibid, para 75; the agreement will be upheld unless it would be unfair to the parties 
to hold them to the terms of the agreement. 
30 Despite the qualitative data for this study being collected pre-Radmacher, the data 
illustrates the perennial nature of the issues. See E Hitchings, A study of the views and 
approaches of family practitioners concerning marital property agreements (Law 
Commission, 2011). The qualitative sample was drawn from two focus groups 
comprising 10 practitioners in total and 29 interviews. The focus groups took place in 
London and a regional city in the south of England, with the interviews comprising 
practitioners from London and a northern city. 
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… So you do have to go through those whole scenarios with the clients, to make 
sure they’re fully aware of what they’re entering into. (Solicitor interviewee) 
 
Consequently, although pre-nuptial agreements are negotiated outside of the court 
environment and are only anticipatory to the parties’ potential divorce, it is suggested 
that they fall within the outer margins of official justice due to, inter alia, the use of 
solicitors to draft the agreement, legal principles being used to assist in the process of 
both negotiation and drafting, and the potential weight associated with it post 
Radmacher. Bargaining in the shadow of the law31 is therefore another key 
component of official justice. 
 
In the official justice space, legal principles and procedures are prescribed and 
recognised by the participants, and settlements are negotiated and formalised in the 
shadow of the law. The shadow here is at its darkest and most intense. The law has its 
most direct and obvious impact within the official justice space where its shadow is 
most clearly evident and where formality and ‘formal’ law are particularly significant. 
This can be seen to best effect by drawing upon the example of consent orders.  
 
While consent orders can be drafted outside of the formal justice environment (by 
mediators and litigants in person),32 many consent order applications will be drafted 
by solicitors who inhabit the official justice space.33 Official justice focuses on the use 
of formal legal principles to frame the terms of any agreement made between the 
parties, although as research has demonstrated, factors contributing to settlement are 
rarely simple.34 Where couples have resort to the court, official justice will be served 
at least in a procedural manner. The consent order will be checked by a district judge 
against the legal rules and objectives of that system. However, in an era when consent 
orders are being routed through mass production lines in large regional divorce 
centres, the amount of scrutiny (and therefore substantive justice) that such consent 
orders can be given is unclear and unknown.35 As an indication of the potential 
problems with ‘mass inspection’ of consent order applications, one of the participants 
in a recent judicial focus group for the Hitchings and Miles financial remedies 
settlement project, spoke to this type of problem when reflecting on a potentially 
unfair consent order application in a scenario presented to them: 
 																																																								
31 R Mnookin and L Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the shadow of the law: the case of 
divorce’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950. 
32 Drafting consent orders is not one of the six reserved activities under the Legal 
Services Act 2007, ss 14-17. The six reserved legal activities are: the exercise of 
rights of audience; the conduct of litigation; reserved instrument activities; probate 
activities; notarial activities; and the administration of oaths. 
33 E Hitchings, J Miles and H Woodward, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: 
Understanding financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 2013), p 52.  
34 See for example E Hitchings et al, ibid, in particular Table 4.1 at p 86-87. 
35 For further discussion, see J Miles and E Hess, ‘The recognition of money work as 
a specialty in the family courts by the creation of a national network of Financial 
Remedies Units’ [2016] Fam Law 1335, and M O’Dwyer, E Hess and J Miles, 
‘Financial Remedies Courts’ [2017] Fam Law 625, where the authors suggest the 
introduction of specialist financial remedies courts to address, inter alia, problems 
associated with judicial inconsistency in the handling of financial remedy cases. 
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[In] a divorce unit where [they] do fifty of these in a day, [they] don’t have the 
time to start mucking about with these.  If they look okay on paper, [they’re] not 
going to... If there’s an obvious query [they’re] going to raise it, but ... [sentence 
tails off] 
(District Judge focus group participant)36 
 
In the Mapping Paths study, Anne Barlow et al concluded that the ‘law casts the 
deepest and most extensive shadow over solicitor negotiations, with the process being 
focused on the application of legal principles and the default option of a court 
determination. … The law casts a lighter but still discernible shadow over 
mediation.’37 While this tallies with the official (and operative) shadow analysis 
suggested here, Barlow et al also suggest that the shadow that appears in collaborative 
law is much less defined and that ‘it appears to fall most lightly of all on collaborative 
law processes.’38 Given the placement of collaborative law within official justice, at 
first glance, this appears to run counter to the argument suggested here. However, the 
shadow exercised in the official justice space does not necessarily have to be of the 
same intensity in each official settlement pathway and as Barlow et al recognised, the 
more discernible shadow of the law observed in the mediation process was due in 
large part to solicitors playing an important role ‘in helping to bring the shadow of the 
law to bear on mediation’ and that this will have been ‘substantially diminished by the 
LASPO legal aid reforms with the possible result that the law has become less 
normative in mediation.’39 Furthermore, Barlow et al and Mark Sefton in his research 
report into collaborative law, do not suggest that law, nor its shadow, is absent in the 
collaborative process, with both reflecting on legal advice40 and legal norms 
‘providing a framework for clients in negotiations’.41 Lawyers in the collaborative 
process have always been able to provide legal advice to their clients, unlike 
mediation, where mediators provide only legal information, albeit with different 
levels of intervention and even directivity.42 On this basis, it seems appropriate to 
suggest that the law’s shadow, particularly in the post LASPO era, may become 
stronger within collaborative law compared with mediation, particularly without the 
ongoing presence of lawyers.  
 																																																								
36 The financial remedies settlement project was a mixed methods study which 
comprised a court file survey of just under 400 financial remedy cases from four 
courts around England in 2012 and 32 interviews with solicitors and mediators from 
those four areas during 2012-2013. This data was later supplemented with two focus 
groups with first instance judges from local courts (14 judges) in 2016. For further 
discussion of the methodology for stage one of the study, see E Hitchings et al, 
Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: Understanding financial settlement on divorce (Bristol 
University, 2013), Appendix A. 
37 See A Barlow, R Hunter, J Smithson and J Ewing, Mapping Paths to Family 
Justice: Resolving Family Disputes in Neoliberal Times (Palgrave, 2017), pp 184-94. 
38 Ibid, p 194. 
39 Ibid, p 194. 
40 Ibid, p 194. 
41 M Sefton, Collaborative law in England and Wales: early findings. A research 
report for Resolution (Summary) (Resolution, 2009), p 5. 
42 E Hitchings and J Miles, ‘Mediation, financial remedies, information provision and 
legal advice: the post-LASPO conundrum’ (2016) 38(2) JSWFL 175.	
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Participants experiencing official justice will typically find themselves using either 
the formal channels of the Child Maintenance Service (CMS); using the services of an 
arbitrator or solicitors in a collaborative law framework; negotiating their private 
family dispute through solicitors; or having their case adjudicated or consent order 
approved at court. While these individuals will be the recipients of official justice, the 
body or individual implementing justice will vary depending on the route to 
settlement. In the case of arbitration, adjudication and the CMS, those implementing 
official justice are respectively, the arbitrator, judge or CMS administrative 
mechanisms. Within collaborative law and solicitor negotiation the implementor is 
less obvious. Where these negotiations result in an agreement which is formalised by 
a consent order, justice will be implemented by the judge. When this settlement path 
is unsuccessful, individuals are faced with three justice paths: maintain the official 
route and opt for formal adjudication where justice will once again be implemented 
by the judge adjudicating in the case; or the parties can withdraw into the operative or 
outsider justice spaces where the body or individual implementing justice is less 
clearly defined.43 Given the variety of settlement paths available, parties are able to 
move from one justice space to another. In doing so, it is both the route and 
destination that defines the type of justice that the parties are using. Parties can 
negotiate their agreement within any of the justice spaces and can then move 
elsewhere to implement it. The consequence being that some individuals may 
experience more than one justice space in the quest for settlement. 
 
However, the option of official justice is becoming increasingly limited to certain 
constituents within the population. Participants who are undertaking or receiving 
justice in the official space are a small and diminishing group. Collaborative law for 
example, is a minority pursuit.44 According to the most recent Family court statistics, 
only 32.4% of all divorce cases started in 2014 had a financial remedy order. This is a 
notable reduction from 41% of all divorce cases only a decade earlier.45 It therefore 
seems inevitable that in the wake of legal aid cuts, only those who are able to obtain 
legal aid through the exception routes,46 parties who have a particularly high conflict 
case,47 are particularly vexatious,48 or those who can simply afford to go to court and 
																																																								
43 See discussion of the operative and outsider spaces below. 
44 See for example, E Hitchings et al, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: Understanding 
financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 2013), Chart 2.1 at p 36.  
45 Family Court statistics quarterly. Family court tables: January to March 2017 
(MoJ, 2017), Table 11. 
46 Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, s 10 and Sch 1.  
47 See Table 4.1 in E Hitchings et al, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: Understanding 
financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 2013), pp 86-87 for a range of 
factors which have been identified as influencing or precluding settlement in financial 
remedy cases. In particular the personal characteristics of the parties including their 
emotional situation and their lack of willingness to engage with one another, as well 
as lack of disclosure, are some of the factors which are more likely to lead to the 
dispute resulting in a court application. 	
48 A number of previous empirical studies have referred to the unmeritorious, high 
conflict or serial litigant case within the court: See L Trinder, R Hunter, E Hitchings, 
J Miles, R Moorhead, L Smith, M Sefton, V Hinchly, K Bader and J Pearce, Litigants 
in person in private family law cases (MoJ, 2014), ch 2 and L Trinder, J Hunt, A 
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have some form of property, pensions or income to argue over49 will be able or 
willing to afford the associated increased costs of a court hearing,50 as the following 
quote from the Hitchings and Miles financial remedies settlement research highlights: 
 
And you tend to find with the finances – the wealthier people want the protection 
more. So they’re the ones who want to pay for that protection of a Consent 
Order. (Solicitor interviewee) 
 
To a large extent, official justice appears to have become a two-tiered system. Court-
based solutions and solicitor-led settlement routes will be available for those who can 
afford it at one end of the scale, while at the other end, poorer groups and the 
vulnerable (apart from those still eligible for legal aid) will be forced into the 
operative and outsider justice spaces. However, the exception within the official space 
is child support, where data emphasises how vulnerable and poorer groups have been 
more reliant on official justice rather than operative or outsider justice. These groups 
have been the major users of formal, statutory routes in the past. In his analysis of two 
large-scale datasets,51 Stephen McKay suggests that there is a class/money distinction 
in the types of ‘calculation and collection’ system for child maintenance, with the use 
of statutory agencies ‘most common for non-working and lower social class 
recipients. … In other words, the key means of assessing and paying child support 
that the government is trying to promote, voluntary agreements, are least common for 
the poorest families.’52 This is unsurprising given the previous statutory requirement 
for parents with care who were in receipt of benefits being compelled to comply with 
the Child Support Agency and therefore forced to use official justice.53 It is also 
reflective of need of these groups to rely on public services, compared with the 																																																																																																																																																														
Macleod, J Pearce and H Woodward, Enforcing contact orders: problem-solving or 
punishment? (University of Exeter, 2013), ch 5. 
49 A recent survey of court file data on cases in which a petition for divorce had been 
issued on or after 1 April 2009 and a final financial remedy order had been made on 
or before 31 December 2010, found that, despite the data being collected whilst legal 
aid was still available (for lower income cases), the median net income for husbands 
in the file survey data was £21,996 pa and the median net income for wives was 
£15,300 pa. The median total net capital including the family home was £113,515. H 
Woodward with M Sefton, Pensions on Divorce: An empirical study (Cardiff 
University, 2014), p 19. 
50 House of Commons Justice Committee, Courts and tribunals fees, Second Report 
of Session 2016-2017, HC 167. 
51 The Family Resources Survey and Understanding Society. For a more detailed 
methodology see S McKay, ‘Child Support, child contact and social class’ in J 
Wallbank and J Herring (eds), Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law (Routledge, 
2014), p 173.	
52 Ibid, p 176. See also N Maplethorpe, J Chanfreau, D Philo and C Tait, Families 
with children in Britain: Findings from the 2008 Families with Children Study 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2010), p 365 and table 15.1, where the data 
demonstrated that: ‘Families who received a CSA assessment only [there was no 
other child maintenance agreement in place] were more likely to be social tenants (54 
per cent) than private tenants (39 per cent) or living in owned (or mortgaged) 
accommodation (23 per cent) (see Table 15.3).’ 
53 Child Support Act 1991, s 6. 
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invisibility and privacy that the middle classes can afford.54 Whether this socio-
economic division continues with the removal of compulsion will depend on the 
willingness, capability and viability of the parents concerned to negotiate without risk 
or difficulty, or even at all.  
 
Having identified the place of dispute and the participants involved, the following 
section will examine the type of justice being produced within the official space 
including the methods used to obtain justice. As discussed previously, the most 
obvious types of official justice are adjudicated decisions through the use of legal 
principles which are prescribed and recognised by all participants in the process. 
However, the official justice space in private family law encompasses more than pure 
formal adjudicated justice. Private family law disputes in the courts are addressed 
through a ‘problem-solving, future-oriented approach’,55 which means that official 
justice is much more than the application of formal legal rules and is a further reason 
why the import of law and its shadow can vary across different family justice paths. 
In drawing attention to this approach in lower value financial remedy cases, solicitors 
and judges are generally practical and pragmatic.56 In the Hitchings and Miles 
financial remedies settlement research, one of the participants in the judicial focus 
groups emphasised this problem-solving approach to financial remedy disputes when 
discussing a needs-based scenario: 
 
‘But I would always look into it and they don’t need a four-bedroom house, two 
boys of not dissimilar age can share a room.  People do and they might move to a 
less fashionable part of [county].  You know one’s got to look at the practicalities 
and it’s no good getting too sentimental about the children’s home, because home 
is where the heart is.’ (District Judge focus group participant) 
 
This is a useful example of how even within official justice, the focus is on ‘problem-
solving’ within family disputes. The discretion inherent within s 25 Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 ‘justice’ opens up this area of private family law to a discourse 
framed around personal problems in addition to, or even, rather than legal disputes.57 
In the post LASPO landscape, this enables the legal services market to develop in 
ways which focus on individuals’ vulnerabilities and their support needs and provides 
a more legitimate opportunity to emerging service providers in the unregulated 
sector.58  
 
																																																								
54 My thanks to Joanna Miles for raising this point. 
55 L Trinder et al, Enforcing contact orders: problem-solving or punishment? 
(University of Exeter, 2013), p 37. 
56 See for example, E Hitchings et al, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: Understanding 
financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 2013) and K Wright, ‘The role of 
solicitors in divorce: a note of caution’ [2007] CFLQ 481. 
57A Diduck, ‘Autonomy and family justice’ [2016] CFLQ 133 at p 143. 
58 Fee-charging McKenzie Friends for example have come to the fore in recent years 
as one means of plugging the post-LASPO support gap. A quick trawl of websites 
will see a range of ‘professional’, and yet unregulated, McKenzie Friends charging 
for their support services. See Society of Professional McKenzie Friends: 
http://www.mckenziefriends.directory/index.html 
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Therefore, in response to Eekelaar and Maclean’s quote at the beginning of this 
section, it is increasingly problematic to assert that the current family justice system is 
there to try to prevent individuals abandoning or compromising their legal rights. It is 
also problematic to assert with any confidence that formal justice is available for all 
when one considers the reality of the resolution of private disputes for the majority of 
divorcing and separating couples; the mounting hurdles to formal justice with the 
increase in court fees and the unavailability of legal aid; the focus on settlement 
outside of the formal justice system and an emphasis on mediation and forms of 
dispute resolution other than the courts. Official justice relies on the trained insider to 
navigate and negotiate through the system. However, for those unable to afford the 
cost of professionals trained in the ways and means of these formal routes, the system 
remains complex and difficult to comprehend without support.59 Ultimately, 
settlement regulated by the law (whether inside or outside of the formal court 
environment) is distinct from settlement informally delivered by the parties in terms 
of the way justice is shaped and conceived. Official justice is, in the main, delivered 
and takes place in the more direct shadow of the law. But this shadow becomes much 
more hazy and less defined as we move into the next private family justice space: 
‘operative’ justice.  
 
 
Operative justice 
Operating between the margins of official and outsider justice, the type of justice that 
is being produced within this relatively small space is primarily functional and 
pragmatic. Operative justice focuses on outcomes that will work for the parties, with 
the possibility of some use of legal principle to assist along the way. The key 
distinction between operative justice settlements and official justice settlements is that 
the latter are settled within a more direct shadow of the law and either formally 
approved by law (either through consent orders or adjudication), or formal process 
(collaborative law), or are entered into in anticipation of a formal legal event where 
the agreement will be upheld unless it is unfair to the parties to hold them to the terms 
of the agreement (pre-nuptial agreements). Operative justice settlement is not 
necessarily constrained by these formalities; it can be a stepping-stone en route to 
official justice or the parties can simply use the operative environment for the entirety 
of their dispute. This will result in a non-legally binding agreement if settlement has 
been reached. As Lord Atkin noted in Hyman v Hyman: 
 
‘In my view no agreement between the spouses can prevent the Court from 
considering the question whether in the circumstances of the particular case it 
shall think fit to order the husband to make some reasonable payment to the 
wife, “having regard to her fortune, if any, to the ability of her husband and to 
the conduct of the parties.” The wife’s right to future maintenance is a matter 
of public concern, which she cannot barter away. This is not to say that in any 
particular case the Court must make an order; still less that in this case it must 
do so.’60  
 
A focus on the operative family justice space has been a key component of 
government policy in recent years. For individuals accessing operative justice, the site 																																																								
59 See Trinder et al, Litigants in person in private family law cases (MoJ, 2014). 
60 Hyman v Hyman [1929] AC 601, at 629. 
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of the dispute is outside of the formal court arena, in particular, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR). Operative justice takes places through the services of regulated 
and unregulated family justice providers61 such as mediators and more recently, other 
emerging family justice system operatives such as fee-charging McKenzie Friends 
who are using the post LASPO funding gap to develop their own private family 
justice services. Although fee-charging McKenzie Friends assist litigants in person 
(LiPs) in both the official and operative settings, recent research by Smith et al62 has 
found that the majority of work undertaken by fee-charging McKenzie Friends takes 
place outside of the court. Crucially, the advice and assistance provided by McKenzie 
Friends is not regulated and neither do they have any official standing within the court 
(for example automatic rights of audience). 
 
The numbers and proportion of the separating population who opt for mediation63 and 
fee-charging McKenzie Friends64 are small. Recent legal aid figures show that the 
numbers of mediation starts and mediation outcomes continue to drop,65 while Barlow 
et al have highlighted that less than 1% of the population who separated between 
1996 and 2011 went directly to mediation.66 Furthermore, despite Mediation 
Information and Assessment Meetings being made compulsory67 the same legal aid 
statistics show that the number of mediation assessments has also continued to drop.68  
 
A key feature across both official and operative justice, is the practical and pragmatic 
approach to achieving justice, emphasised through problem-solving and functionality 
of outcomes. This can be seen by reference to child maintenance. One of the main 																																																								
61 See Competition and Market Authority, Legal services market study: Final Report 
(CMA, 2016) for a discussion about the emerging unauthorised providers.  
62 See L Smith, E Hitchings and M Sefton, A study of fee-charging McKenzie Friends 
and their work in private family law cases (Bar Council, 2017).  
63 In research that was conducted prior to the implementation of LASPO, most 
financial remedy arrangements that result in a consent order are reached through 
solicitor negotiation and informal discussion. See E Hitchings et al, Assembling the 
jigsaw puzzle: Understanding financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 
2013), p 36. 
64 See L Smith et al, A study of fee-charging McKenzie Friends and their work in 
private family law cases (Bar Council, 2017) pp 14-15 for an estimation of the 
number of fee-charging McKenzie Friends (approximately 100). This low estimate, 
combined with the figures supplied at p 62 of the report (the number of hearings 
involving McKenzie Friends) suggests that the numbers and proportion of the 
separating population opting for assistance and support from fee-charging McKenzie 
Friends would likewise be small. 
65 In the full year prior to LASPO being implemented (2012-2013), there were 9060 
successful mediation agreements funded by legal aid. Following LASPO’s 
implementation, the number had reduced to 4,602 in 2016-17. Legal aid statistics 
England and Wales tables January to March 2017 (MoJ and Legal Aid Agency, 
2017), table 7.2. 
66 A Barlow, R Hunter, J Smithson and J Ewing, Mapping Paths to Family Justice: 
Briefing Paper and Report on Key Findings (Exeter University, 2014) p 6.  
67 Children and Families Act 2014, s 10 
68 Legal aid statistics England and Wales tables January to March 2017 (MoJ and 
Legal Aid Agency, 2017), Table 7.1. 
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planks of government policy has been to shift the responsibility of child maintenance 
onto parents’ shoulders with a mixture of carrots and sticks designed to encourage 
people to make family-based arrangements instead of using official justice routes – 
the courts or the statutory scheme. In one sense, this shift is an example of child 
support moving beyond the official and operative spaces and into outsider justice as 
the focus is on private ordering outside of any official routes to justice. However, with 
the online child support guidance and calculator available as a tool for parties, 
statutory (legal) guidance is being provided online, providing a functional operative 
tool for parents in need of some focused support. Given that the state has taken 
responsibility in setting out this formula and making a calculation tool available, the 
child maintenance ‘gateway’69 could, in one sense, be classified as providing official 
justice for the parties. However, the online child maintenance tool and the creation of 
the child maintenance gateway are examples of methods of operative justice: use of 
the tool is not mandatory and couples are free to negotiate around the figures provided 
with individual negotiation and bargaining being promoted against a background of 
legal norms and principle. Crucially, any arrangement between the parties will be 
informal and not legally binding. Once again, individual responsibility and autonomy 
are key, but unlike the official space, the parties themselves implement and enforce 
their own ‘operative’ justice. Through the use of online guidance, the government is 
attempting to prioritise functional and pragmatic justice that will ‘work’ for the 
parties because there is no requirement for the child support calculator to be rigidly 
followed. Without any formal agreement or official mechanisms to enforce the 
parties’ informal arrangements, this is the point at which we leave any semblance of 
official justice behind and move fully into the operative space. In theory, both parties 
remain entitled to apply to the Child Maintenance Service for an ‘official’ calculation 
and to obtain enforcement of any child maintenance obligations, but doing so will 
move them from the operative into the official justice space. 
 
Parties within the operative space are encouraged to come up with an agreement that 
will work for them. The recipients of operative justice are therefore individuals who 
are either able to receive legal aid for mediation or have the funds available to pay for 
the regulated or unregulated service providers within the operative space. For 
recipients of operative justice in relation to child support, they are expected to be 
‘digital self-servers – people who have the skills, access and motivation to use digital 
services unaided.’70 However, less than one-third of the UK population71 is currently 
classed in this way despite a policy framework that encourages the majority of parents 
to rely on this online support to assist them in their familial dispute.72 Faced with a 
low proportion of the population who have the requisite skills and facility to rely on 
this operative framework, the potential result is that for these parents, any child 
maintenance agreement and subsequent payment may be below the recommended 
																																																								
69 Individuals who wish to make use of the statutory Child Maintenance Service must 
first have a ‘gateway conversation’ in order to establish whether it would be possible 
to make a private maintenance arrangement instead. See Child Support Act 1991, s 
9(2A). 
70 Ministry of Justice, Transforming our justice system: summary of reforms and 
consultation, Cm 9321 (2016), para 7.1.3 
71 Ibid. 
72 D Henshaw, Recovering child support: routes to responsibility, Cm 6894 (2006). 
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statutory levels or non-existent.73 Furthermore, McKay’s analysis of the class/money 
distinction in the types of ‘calculation and collection’ system for child maintenance, 
highlights how the richer groups and middle classes are most likely to use voluntary 
agreements (approximately six out of ten recipients),74 although the proportion that 
have used the online tools to achieve that outcome is unknown. As McKay argues: 
‘…for many middle-class families the reforms to child support are largely irrelevant. 
They have reliable child support agreements in place. It is those more vulnerable 
families who are more likely to use the statutory system, and hence have more to lose 
from policy that shifts to greater individual responsibility, and where the residual state 
backup is likely to be costly.’75  
 
Within operative justice, a focus on ‘problem-solving’ could leave some families 
vulnerable as a consequence of potential simplification of legal rights and 
responsibilities. Alison Diduck argues that ‘there is a broader concern if 
individualised, therapeutic problem solving is said, as it is, to be part of a justice 
system, but is not scrutinised, regulated or governed by the rules or objectives of that 
system, including the rule of law, equality, substantive fairness and due process.’76 
For example, agreements that have been self-negotiated or agreed through a mediator 
may only be examined through a legal lens if such an agreement is brought before the 
court via an application for a consent order. The process of operative justice therefore 
centres on the use of ‘individually negotiated norms’77 to arrive at settlement. 
However, these individual norms can result in dispute as well as agreement. In the 
Mapping Paths study, Barlow et al highlighted how the individual norms held by each 
party differed in relation to whether the dispute was about children or finances, and 
these norms were also gendered. In children’s matters, for example, the predominant 
norms held by mothers were child welfare and the status quo position, but for fathers, 
rights and formal equality were central.78 Operative justice settlements therefore 
concern familial disputes where the parties’ individual positions are brought to the 
fore. During the negotiation process, parties may have some legal awareness, but the 
focus on individually negotiated norms leaves only a limited role for the law to cast 
its shadow.  
 
The law’s shadow is much more diffuse in operative justice than in the official justice 
space. For instance, on an orthodox view of mediation, mediators do not give legal 
advice. They will only provide neutral legal information and signposting to clients 
during mediation. The provision of tailored individualised legal advice is the preserve 																																																								
73 See C Bryson, A Skipp, J Allbeson, E Poole, E Ireland and V Marsh, The Kids 
Aren’t Free: the child maintenance arrangements of single parents on benefit in 2012 
(Nuffield Foundation, 2013), p 10, where it was found that 64% of single parents on 
out-of-work benefits do not receive any child maintenance from their child’s other 
parent and 43% have no child maintenance arrangement in place at all. 
74 S McKay, ‘Child Support, child contact and social class’ in J Wallbank and J 
Herring (eds), Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law (Routledge, 2014), p 176.  
75 Ibid, p 177. 
76 A Diduck, ‘Autonomy and family justice’ [2016] CFLQ 133, at 136. 
77 L Webley, ‘When is a Family Lawyer a Lawyer?’ in M Maclean, J Eekelaar and 
Bastard, Delivering Family Justice in the 21st Century (Hart, 2015), at p 308. 
78 A Barlow et al, Mapping Paths to Family Justice: Briefing Paper and Report on 
Key Findings (Exeter University, 2014), p 22.  
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of the solicitor who, on the same orthodox view, would also draft the consent order. 
In this scenario, the clients would therefore move from the operative to official justice 
space. The current debate about whether mediators should be able to draft consent 
orders79 not only highlights the way in which the law’s shadow becomes more 
diffused in the operative setting, but also the potential for an increasingly limited role 
for the law within operative justice and the blurred boundaries between official and 
operative justice. While settlement of a private family law dispute through mediation 
is an example of operative justice, the process of drafting the consent order moves it 
from the operative to official justice space. In one sense this highlights why the 
process is controversial. Mediators are neutral facilitators within the process of 
settlement discussion. They do not have an official justice ‘tag’. They are 
implementing operative justice within the system. While the proposal to allow 
mediators to draft consent orders is a pragmatic and practicable solution to a 
problem,80 it offends the very nature of official justice. The type of justice being 
produced by official justice is at its heart substantive justice based on, or negotiated 
within the boundaries of legal norms and principles which are prescribed and 
recognised. The mediator is not part of the official justice system and their role is not 
to start the official justice process through the drafting of a consent order. Although a 
judge will be required to approve any consent order that is drafted, in the days of mass 
judicial approval of consent orders via divorce centres, there is no research which 
informs us as to whether a District Judge will be alert to a potentially unfair financial 
consent order application, particularly if it is apparent from the court file that there 
has been no clear legal input. Furthermore, while some participants in the mediation 
process will have received independent legal advice during the course of the 
mediation itself, there is no guarantee that either party will have done so. Not only 
does this highlight how there is potential for the role of law within operative justice to 
be downplayed or even absent, but the role of legal expertise is diminished. In order 
to provide more affordable operative justice, the more costly official justice is 
increasingly being sidelined. As various settlement routes move further away from the 
official justice space, many families could be left vulnerable as a consequence of 
potential simplification of legal rights and responsibilities, particularly when dividing 
assets, but also agreeing upon arrangements for children. Those who require official 
justice to validate any agreement should have their dispute and any outcome framed 
by legal rules and principles by someone operating within that space who has 
expertise and knowledge of those legal norms. An orthodox understanding of the role 
of solicitors and individualised legal advice during mediation provides parties with 
																																																								
79 Family Mediation Council, Consultation: Family Mediators Drafting Consent 
Orders (FMC, 2016). 
80 The old version of the Family Mediation Code of Practice was silent on the issue of 
whether mediators should be allowed to draft consent orders. The orthodox model of 
family mediation provides that the mediator and solicitor roles are complementary, 
with the parties’ solicitors giving partial legal advice on any mediated agreement. 
There are increasing reports that mediation clients want a ‘one-stop shop’ and there 
have been anecdotal reports of mediators drafting consent orders for their mediation 
clients.  
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that legal safety net which is not provided by legal information alone,81 nor through 
mediators drafting consent orders. 
 
Problem-solving and pragmatism are key elements within operative justice. Pre-
LASPO, mediation fulfilled various government objectives in this regard, while in the 
post-LASPO landscape, the legal services market has developed to provide support 
for individuals who are unable to afford experts from the official justice space 
(lawyers) but who speak to the needs of this group (for example, fee-charging 
McKenzie Friends). With ‘problem-solving’ becoming an accepted discourse, family 
law beyond official justice has become couched in and framed around personal 
problems rather than legal disputes.82 Providers in the new legal services market have 
therefore responded to these needs by providing a support service offering help and 
assistance in navigating the official justice space. Operative justice relies on the 
capacity of individuals to self-produce justice particularly with regard to 
understanding the nature of their own private family dispute, whether that is in terms 
of finances or the welfare of their children. This is reasonable when both parties are 
fully autonomous individuals, but there remain questions over substantive justice 
where this is not the case particularly as settlement produced within the operative 
space takes place beyond the direct shadow of the law. 
 
Outsider justice 
Commentary and research to date has largely focused on those family disputes 
formalised by the court process or those outside the formal system but still engaged in 
some element of it, whether as a LiP, a client of mediation, or another means of 
accessing some form of operative justice. However, the majority of separating couples 
now take a ‘DIY’ approach to managing family breakup. Around 90 per cent of 
separating parents do not use the courts to formalise child arrangements83 and 
approximately two-thirds of couples who divorce each year do not pursue any 
financial legal remedies through the courts.84 This ‘DIY’ population in this 
delegalised space are therefore the main participants in and recipients of outsider 
justice: the where and who of outsider justice. To date, there has been little research 
into this large, silent majority of the divorcing and separating population that fails to 
get any formal recognition of their financial separation or child arrangements.85 
Consequently, this delegalised space is a key site for new empirical research in the 
post-LASPO era, in particular, examining the effects of delegalisation on families 
																																																								
81 For further discussion, see E Hitchings and J Miles, ‘Mediation, financial remedies, 
information provision and legal advice: the post-LASPO conundrum’ (2016) 38(2) 
JSWFL 175.	
82 See J Masson, ‘Thinking about contact – a social or a legal problem?’ [2002] CFLQ 
15, about how contact is very narrowly construed as a legal problem. 
83 A Blackwell and F Dawe, Non-Resident Parental Contact (ONS, 2003). 
84 Family Court statistics quarterly. Family court tables: January to March 2017 
(MoJ, 2017) Table 11. 
85 For some research and discussion, see S Arthur, J Lewis, M Maclean, S Finch and 
R Fitzgerald, Settling Up: making financial arrangements after divorce or separation 
(National Centre for Social Research, 2002) and D Marjoribanks, Breaking up is hard 
to do: Assisting families to navigate family relationship support before, during and 
after separation (Relate, 2015). 
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within this population and what online and offline support mechanisms families are 
using during the course of their family dispute.86 
 
The answers to these questions are unknown to both researchers and the family justice 
system. Yet, even in the absence of research on this population, the family justice 
DIYer is being encouraged to put together his or her own settlement and has become 
the idealised disputant as far as policy is concerned. In addition to the expectation of 
being able to be ‘digital self-servers’,87 this idealised ‘outsider’ is someone who is 
able to deal with the emotional and practical fallout arising from relationship 
breakdown in order to settle their dispute outside the court system, the corollary being 
that those who require the assistance of the court in their family disputes are 
settlement failures: 
 
‘… (The legal aid) reforms do violence to the most vulnerable separating 
parents, the 10 per cent, by highlighting their prescribed distinctiveness from 
the majority. The fact that they are singled out as failing to achieve the desired 
norm of agreement demeans them. This is consolidated by the strength of the 
norms that parents should assume responsibility for coming to agreements 
themselves …’88 
 
While those needing recourse to the court are characterised as settlement ‘failures’ – 
individuals who have been unable to ‘develop the requisite skills to come to their own 
agreement’89, the 90% in children disputes and the two-thirds of the divorcing 
population for financial issues, are perceived as settlement successes; individuals who 
have been able to self-manage their relationship dispute without demanding the use of 
the court. This discourse reinforces the position of settlement as a key norm within 
family justice. 
 
The concept of ‘outsider’ justice has its origin in the type of justice that is being 
delivered and the role of law and procedure in that delivery. Ex-partners who engage 
in non-formal means to settle their disputes are acting beyond the formal routes of 
justice (notionally) available to them – they are ‘off-radar’ and are fully autonomous 
individuals from a family justice system standpoint and therefore have no need of 
legal involvement. From a procedural perspective, they are outside the formal family 
justice system. But that means that if these couples are settling their disputes then they 
are not obtaining consent orders for their cases. Without a consent order, couples do 
not receive the consequent benefits of certainty and finality by formalising any 
																																																								
86 Further research questions may include: whether ex-couples remain in an unsettled 
dispute or whether they obtain settlement? The reasons why couples do not formalise 
their separation? How is any settlement achieved? Do these informal settlements 
work? What are the short and longer-term outcomes for the parties and any children? 
Do couples experience any compliance issues and if so, how are these addressed? 
87 Ministry of Justice, Transforming our justice system: summary of reforms and 
consultation, Cm 9321 (2016), para 7.1.3. 
88 J Wallbank,‘Universal norms, individualization and the need for recognition: the 
failure(s) of the self-managed post-separation family’ in J Wallbank and J Herring 
(eds), Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law (Routledge, 2014), p 92. 
89 Ibid, p 75 
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separation agreement.90 In interview data that was collected in the Hitchings and 
Miles financial remedies settlement study prior to the implementation of LASPO, the 
following solicitor discussed the effect of LASPO on their clients who at that point 
were in receipt of legal aid: 
 
‘A lot of them, especially when they have very minimal assets, they aren’t 
going to be too concerned about the Consent Orders – because we find that 
already. … Finances – if there’s nothing to get, they’re not going to spend the 
money to try and get that clean break in any event.’  
(Solicitor interviewee) 
 
As this quote highlights, the ‘DIYer’ within the family justice system is not a new 
creature that has emerged since LASPO. The delegalised space has always been 
present. But LASPO and corresponding government policy across private family law 
has focused attention on the increasing numbers of couples who remain, or choose to 
conduct their dispute outside of the official family justice system, or simply find 
themselves there, wilfully or not. As discussed previously, research is yet to clarify 
the route they have used which may, or may not result in ‘settlement’, or the capacity 
of individuals to self-produce justice without any formal family justice system 
mechanisms in place to assist. Indeed, an overriding question remains – are the 
majority actually ‘settling’, or is the ‘settlement’ between DIYers being achieved 
through agreement, passivity, coercion, compliance or uncertainty?  
 
A further element of outsider justice is the type of justice that individuals are subject 
to when settling their family disputes. Policy documents emphasise how the role of 
law within private family disputes generally is being downplayed and the 
corresponding discourse focuses on an individual’s autonomy and personal life 
choices.91 By focusing on the discourse of autonomy within private family disputes, 
the family dispute DIYer is being actively encouraged by the state to plough their 
own furrow when it comes to arranging their private family matters. Legal rights and 
responsibilities appear to be pushed to one side, or at least not actively engaged, in the 
pursuit of autonomous decision-making outside of the formal justice system. A key 
aspect of this is simplification. Although research is yet to clarify the substance of 
‘outsider’ settlements, for present purposes, an examination of existing empirical data 
and academic commentary suggests that for the outsider, family law is becoming a 
more simplified version of its official form. A dominant discourse is that ex-partners 
should be able to self-manage their own relationship breakdown. With the focus on 
‘problem-solving’ rather than resolving legal disputes, the discourse has subtly 
shifted, moving the emphasis away from legal provisions to an ‘anyone can problem 
solve’ mantra.  
 
As the Law Commission says, ‘(b)argaining “in the shadow of the law”, seeking to 
produce the sort of outcome that the courts would have ordered, is very difficult if the 																																																								
90 See Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14. 
91 ‘(T)here is a range of other cases which can very often result from a litigant’s own 
decisions in their personal life. … Where the issue is one which arises from the 
litigant’s own personal choices, we are less likely to consider that these cases concern 
issues of the highest importance’: Ministry of Justice, Proposals for the Reform of 
Legal Aid in England and Wales, Cm 7967 (MoJ, 2010), para 4.19. 
	 20	
law is not known and not accessible.’92 DIYers are unable to bargain in the shadow of 
the law as the legal principles themselves may not be known to them given the lack of 
access to legal advice through legal aid, and the inherently discretionary exercise 
under s 25 MCA 1973 and the private law provisions of the Children Act 1989. What 
evidence there is, from the recent research on court and ADR studies, suggests that 
some individuals struggle without some professional advice to at least signpost them 
in the right direction,93 leaving ‘outsiders’ vulnerable and willing to listen to any form 
of apparently semi-authoritative guidance:94  
 
‘On being approached with a self-negotiated agreement, the solicitor realised that 
the wife had not considered the husband’s “fantastic” pension and, crucially, had 
not realised that she could make a claim on it. This omission was mentioned to 
the wife who then wanted to renegotiate the agreement in order to claim some of 
the pension. The husband, in response, was reported to be prevaricating and 
“holding her to ransom with numerous things, including the house sale.”’ 
(Solicitor interviewee)95  
 
Claims from one party about ‘owning’ a particular family asset, such as a work-place 
pension scheme,96 and corresponding lack of knowledge of how assets are classified 
upon divorce or separation, demonstrate how outsider justice can be based on notions 
of justice far removed from the substantive law. When discussing settlement, DIYers 
may confuse law with ‘social or moral notions of justice’,97 in the same way that 
research has identified in relation to LiPs.98 However, this is not unique to LiPs and 
those without legal guidance. Previous research has identified that morality and 
emotion are a feature in solicitor negotiation and settlement.99 In the delegalised 																																																								
92 Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements, Law Com No 
343 (TSO, 2014), para 1.23. 
93 See, for example, L Trinder et al, Litigants in person in private family law cases 
(MoJ, 2014) and E Hitchings et al, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: Understanding 
financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 2013).   
94 For example, individuals ‘crowdsourcing’ support and advice through the use of 
online forums such as Families Need Fathers and Mumsnet. See L Smith, ‘Chasing 
Shadows: online information and advice on family law disputes’, paper presented at 
Leverhulme International Network Conference on New Families; New Governance, 
London: University of Notre Dame London Campus, September 2014, 
http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/collegeofsocialsciencesand
internationalstudies/law/familyregulationandsociety/Speakers_Briefing_papers_all_se
ssions.pdf p 84. 
95 E Hitchings et al, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: Understanding financial settlement 
on divorce (Bristol University, 2013), p 131. 
96 H Woodward with M Sefton, Pensions on Divorce: An empirical study (Cardiff 
Law School, 2014), p 106 and p 139. Furthermore, Woodward and Sefton highlighted 
that the involvement of practitioners was a key element as to whether financial 
remedy outcomes included a pension order (p 119 and 134). 
97 R Moorhead and M Sefton, Unrepresented litigants in person in first instance 
proceedings (DCA, 2005), 256. 
98 Ibid. 
99 See, for example E Hitchings et al, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: Understanding 
financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 2013). 
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space, however, outsider justice may well lean towards a more moral notion of 
justice, exacerbating an individual’s tendencies to associate justice with morality and 
therefore what law ‘should’ or ‘ought’ to require. This moral notion of justice could 
be based on an ex-spouse’s adultery or general hurt over a relationship breakdown 
and the other party’s ‘unreasonable behaviour’ which ‘may impede the (DIYer’s) 
emotional readiness to settle and colour their view of what outcome is substantively 
fair’.100 This may leave ‘outsider’ ex-partners vulnerable to settlement based on a 
particular version of justice rather than legal principle. 
 
Simplification may also be generated through the attractiveness of legal myths. We 
know from research on cohabitants, that legal myths overshadow cohabitants’ 
disputes101 and that the myth of the common law marriage prevails for large sectors of 
this population.102 However, the Law Commission also highlighted that myths can 
and do permeate the divorcing population who lack access to any official routes to or 
forms of justice. 
 
‘Accordingly, a couple seeking to negotiate a financial settlement on divorce, 
without the means to afford lawyers and without the inclination to go through the 
court process, may have great difficulty in discerning what their legal rights and 
responsibilities are. They may be under the impression that the law requires them 
to share everything on a 50:50 basis. They may be under the impression that the 
wife is entitled to lifelong support, or to no support – and that confusion may be 
exacerbated by … the fact that there appears to be significant differences in the 
levels of support awarded by courts in different parts of the country.’103 
 
In tandem with an increasingly limited influence of legal principle and the complexity 
of financial remedy law which makes it hard to convey to lay people,104 legal 
marriage myths have the potential to exert a similar influence on divorcing outsiders. 
This is particularly problematic for those outsiders who are ‘digitally excluded’105 
given increasing reliance on digitisation and online support mechanisms.106 Since less 
than one-third of the population is considered to have the necessary skill-set to access 
digital services unaided, legal marriage myths, such as ‘equality of asset division’ 																																																								
100 Ibid, p 117. 
101 See A Barlow, C Burgoyne, E Clery and J Smithson, ‘Cohabitation and the Law: 
Myths, Money and the Media’ in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, M Phillips and E 
Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: The 24th Report (Sage, 2008) and G Douglas, J 
Pearce and H Woodward, A Failure of Trust: Resolving Property Disputes on 
Cohabitation Breakdown (Cardiff and Bristol Universities, 2007). 
102 See A Barlow et al (2008), ibid and R Probert, ‘The Evolution of the Common 
Law Marriage Myth’ [2011] Fam Law 283. 
103 Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements, Law Com No 
343 (TSO, 2014), at para 2.55. 
104 See Advicenow, A survival guide to sorting out your finances when you get 
divorced (Advicenow, 2017) available at http://www.advicenow.org.uk/advicenow-
guides. 
105 Ministry of Justice, Transforming our justice system: summary of reforms and 
consultation, Cm 9321 (2016), para 7.1.3.  
106 Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, 
Transforming Our Justice System, (MoJ, 2016) p 6 and 13. 
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upon relationship breakdown and ‘shared parenting as equal time’ may increasingly 
influence the outsider justice discourse.107 In the research report Settling Up, one of 
the responses which featured heavily among interviewees when identifying principles 
which shaped financial arrangements upon relationship breakdown when dividing 
assets was equality of division. While fault was also identified in people’s assessment 
of fairness, the authors noted that although ‘some of these factors reflect the legal 
situation and others do not, it was notable that people’s views did not appear to be 
based strongly in any knowledge or understanding of legal entitlement. Rather they 
were underpinned by pragmatism, emotional preferences, financial constraints, and 
personal values.’108 For individuals experiencing outsider justice, guiding legal 
principles such as fairness and equality may become simplified to the detriment of 
those who would have benefitted from a more nuanced discourse. This could leave 
many families vulnerable to settlements based on erroneous or simplified legal myths 
inappropriate in that particular case.  
 
Given the restricted capacity for doctrinal law to permeate the discourse within this 
space for both married and unmarried couples and given the focus on autonomous 
settlement outside of the court, what role, if any, does law have? From the preceding 
discussion, it is suggested that it is unclear whether outsider justice is pragmatic 
and/or prescribed by legal myths. In an era where the norms and values being 
promoted are privatisation, private ordering, self-regulation and autonomy, any 
conception of justice has as its backdrop the fundamental policy concern of keeping 
private disputes outside of the courts with limited availability of procedural ‘routes’ to 
justice. Where law and legal principle do appear, they appear limited in the following 
respects: the role of law is being downplayed and therefore decreasing in relevance 
for outsider family disputes; legal principle is simplified into ‘soundbites’ or ‘easy 
principles’ such as 50/50 asset division, and legal myths are potentially informing 
outsider justice. While the legal status of marriage or indeed, parenthood can create 
entitlement and responsibility, the new norms of settlement, autonomy and private 
ordering potentially eliminate those legal consequences due to the type of justice that 
is being experienced in the outsider space. Indeed, without support to obtain that 
entitlement and responsibility, one might ask whether government has indirectly 
																																																								
107 When discussing property and superannuation reform in Australia, John Dewar 
suggested that equality is attractive because it ‘serves a number of purposes 
simultaneously: it promotes efficiency by increasing the certainty of the law; it 
promotes justice because it provides the law with a coherent principle that is readily 
understood by ordinary people; and it brings law into line with the social ‘fact’ that 
men and women are economically more equal.’ He went on to examine the basis for 
these arguments and concluded that the evidence used is speculative and selective and 
yet despite this, the principle of equality maintains its appeal. J Dewar, ‘Making 
Family Law New? Property and Superannuation Reform in Australia’ in M Maclean 
(ed), Making Law for Families (Hart, 2000), pp 59-61. 
108 J Arthur et al, Settling Up: making financial arrangements after divorce or 
separation (National Centre for Social Research, 2002), p 72. For further discussion 
of individuals’ rationales when making family decisions, see A Barlow and S Duncan, 
‘New Labour’s Communitarianism, supporting families and the “rationality mistake”: 
Part 1’ (2000) 22(1) JSWFL 23 and H Reece, ‘Leaping without Looking’ in R Lecky, 
After Equality: Family Sex, Kinship (Social Justice) (Routledge, 2014).	
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managed to trivialise one of the key consequences of marriage: the ability to obtain 
financial remedies upon divorce. 	
 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
By examining justice through a settlement lens, it has been argued that settlement 
regulated by the law and formalised through official routes is distinct from settlement 
informally delivered by the parties in terms of the way justice is shaped and 
conceived. The previous discussion has highlighted the key requirements and 
elements of each conception within the new family justice paradigm. The table below 
provides an overview of these key aspects:   
 
 
The new Family Justice paradigm: an overview of Official, Operative and Outsider 
Justice 
 
Conception 
of justice 
Type of justice 
/ Role of law 
and procedure 
Where does 
justice 
occur? 
(place of 
dispute) 
What is 
involved in 
promoting 
justice? 
(method(s) 
used during 
dispute) 
Who is receiving and 
implementing justice? 
(participants involved in 
the dispute) 
Official Formal justice 
using legal 
principles  
which are 
prescribed  and 
recognised  
 
 
Court 
 
Solicitors’ 
offices 
 
Child 
Maintenance 
Service 
Adjudication 
and court 
hearings 
 
Consent 
Orders 
 
Arbitration 
 
Collaborative 
law 
 
Solicitor 
negotiation 
Receiving justice 
Those who can afford 
representation, the 
collaborative or arbitration 
processes, or court fees. 
Those entitled to legal aid 
LiPs 
CMS applicants 
 
Implementing justice 
Judiciary 
Arbitrators 
CMS administrative 
support 
Solicitors 
Operative Functional 
justice – a 
practical and 
pragmatic 
approach to 
achieving justice 
with some use 
of principle 
 
 
Regulated 
Service 
Providers 
providing  
ADR services 
eg Mediation 
 
Unregulated 
service 
providers  
eg Fee-
charging 
McKenzie 
Friends 
ADR such as 
mediation 
 
Online 
statutory 
guidance 
(child 
support) 
 
 
Receiving justice 
Those who get Legal Aid 
for mediation or are able 
to pay for regulated or 
unregulated providers 
 
Digitally enabled 
population able to use the 
online child support 
calculator 
 
Implementing justice 
ADR professionals such 
as mediators 
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Unregulated service 
providers 
Parties themselves 
 
Outsider Beyond formal 
and functional 
justice – unclear 
whether justice 
is non-existent, 
pragmatic, 
prescribed or 
bound by legal 
myths 
 
 
Delegalised 
space 
Online and 
offline 
support 
 
A need for 
research on 
what DIYers 
are doing 
within the 
delegalised 
space 
Receiving and 
implementing justice 
The parties to the dispute. 
This is the majority of the 
separating population, but 
further breakdown is 
difficult due to lack of 
research on this 
population. This will 
include individuals who 
have chosen to remain 
outsiders as well as the 
vulnerable who did not 
qualify for legal aid and/or 
mediation was 
unsuitable/unsuccessful 
 
Despite the general downplaying and simplification of the law within each justice 
space, the official justice process is still predicated on a full representation model,109 
with the complexities of the forms and process having been identified as potentially 
confusing and complex for those new to, and unsure of the system.110 In one respect, 
this highlights how law and legal process is still at the heart of the family justice 
system but lessens as individuals settle their family disputes further away from the 
‘system’s anchor’ – the courts and the judiciary. It also serves to highlight two issues. 
First, that while the legal norms used within family law may appear ‘straightforward’, 
legal concepts such as ‘fairness’ belie a great deal of legal complexity. Secondly, if 
courts and the judiciary remain at the core of the system, then in one sense justice 
without them may be impossible. However, a mass system needs to be able to 
function without the degree of individual attention judge-applied law requires.  
 
Official justice is negotiated and formalised in the direct shadow of the law but this 
shadow becomes much less defined and intense as we move into the operative justice 
space. For the vast majority of outsider private family disputes, the law may no longer 
have any direct relevance and instead, trends towards simplification have been 
identified. Government policy documents have focused on individuals’ ability to 
make their own agreements in child arrangements, finances and child support, and 
with the removal of legal aid, individuals experiencing a family dispute are required 
to access the courts by themselves unless they can afford legal representation or 
obtain or employ lay support. In all of these respects, legal expertise is no longer 
fundamental to a family dispute: ‘(I)t is not the case that everyone is entitled to legal 
																																																								
109 See L Trinder et al, Litigants in person in private family law cases (MoJ, 2014), p 
35. 
110 See L Trinder et al, ibid and E Hitchings et al, Assembling the jigsaw puzzle: 
Understanding financial settlement on divorce (Bristol University, 2013), ch 5 for 
issues raised in relation to the procedural difficulties that LiPs may encounter.	
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representation, funded by the taxpayer, for any dispute or to a particular outcome in 
litigation.’111  
 
The problem with approaches to private family law which do not reflect or take into 
account the substantive law during the negotiation or bargaining stages, is that 
agreements may not necessarily reflect legal entitlements and that law and 
correspondingly, the role of lawyers within the process, is downplayed. For example, 
within the operative space, mediators have been the focus of government policy for 
many years and the recent consultation about mediators drafting consent orders raises 
a raft of issues concerning the role of lawyers within the process. If mediators are 
permitted by their Code of Practice to draft consent orders, a key role for lawyers 
within the existing family justice system will be opened up to other service providers. 
As a consequence, there will be no commitment to legal benchmarking at the end of 
mediation by requiring a solicitor to draft the consent order application and therefore 
to advise the parties on the merits or not of the settlement reached. While settlement 
and agreement between parties going through a private family dispute should 
certainly be encouraged, that should not be to the detriment of the law, legal principle 
and legal norms. Settlement should be achieved in the shadow of the law, not 
regardless of it. The law is there to protect vulnerable individuals and uphold rights 
and responsibilities. Within each family justice space, participants are increasingly 
reliant on themselves, their own (in)ability to settle their family dispute, and to a 
greater or lesser extent depending on the justice space being engaged, their own 
(mis)understanding of family law - to the extent that it can be said that the recent 
trend in family justice is to make lawyers of us all. 
 
 
																																																								
111  Ministry of Justice, Reform of legal aid in England and Wales: The Government 
response, Cm 8072 (2011), para 140.   
